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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

i

Case No. 970439-CA

ROY LEE GLASPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) in that it is an appeal from a
court of record in a criminal case not involving a first-degree or
capital felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the Judge1s
verdict of guilt on the charge of burglary?
2.

Were the burglary and theft part of a single

criminal episode, thereby requiring the lower court to impose a
concurrent term of incarceration?
In reviewing the verdict for sufficiency of evidence,
this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and reverse if such evidence is so inconclusive or
inherently suspect that a reasonable person would reasonably doubt
the defendant's guilt.

State

v. Purcell,

111 P.2 243, 245 (Utah

1985).
Whether the burglary and theft constituted a single
criminal episode is a question of law for which the lower Court's
decision should be reviewed for correctness. State

v. Thurman,

846

P.2 1256f 1271 (Utah 1993).
The issue of sufficiency of evidence was thoroughly
argued by counsel for Defendant in his closing argument at the time
of trial.

(Tr. 129-133).
The claim that the burglary and theft constitute a single

criminal episode was preserved by counsel
hearing.

in the

sentencing

(Tr. of 7/7/97 at 7-8).
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1.
A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with
intent to
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault
on any person. Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-202(1)
(1995).
2. A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in
or upon premises when the premises or any
portion thereof at the time of the entry or
remaining are not open to the public and when
the actor is not otherwise licensed or
privileged to enter or remain on the premises
or such portion thereof. Id./ § 76-6-201(3).
3.
A defendant may be prosecuted in a
criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall
establish offenses which may be punished in
2

different ways under different provisions of
this code, the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other
such provision. Id., § 76-1-402(1).
4. In this part unless the context requires
a different definition,
"single criminal
episode" means all conduct which is closely
related in time and is incident to an attempt
or an accomplishment of single criminal
objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed
to limit or modify the effect of Section 778a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses
and defendants in criminal proceedings. Id.,
§76-1-401 (Supp. 1997).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
&±

Nature of the Case
Defendant was charged by Information with Burglary of a

Non-Dwelling, a Third-Degree Felony and Theft of a sum of over one
thousand dollars, also a Third-Degree Felony.
B. Course of the Proceedings
A jury trial was set for April 2, 1997; however, before
a jury was impaneledf Defendant waived his right to a jury trial
and the trial was held before the Bench.

The Judge entered a

verdict of guilty of both offenses and the matter was set for
sentencing after obtaining a pre-sentence investigation and report.
Defendant was finally sentenced on July 7, 1997.

3

C.

Disposition at Trail Court
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the Court

entered a judgment of conviction against Defendant on both counts
and committed him to the Utah State Prison for two consecutive zero
to five year terms.
D^

Statement of Facts
On January 24, 1997, Defendant and a co-defendant, Shanta

L. Venson (hereinafter "Venson") entered the Cedar City Deseret
Industries store.

Although it was shortly after closing time,

Defendant and Venson were allowed into the store and were assisted
by store personnel.

While Venson was in the process of locating

and purchasing a belt, Defendant took a bank bag containing cash
and check for deposit and stuffed it under his shirt.
Venson left the store with the bag.

He and

(Tr. 52-53, 56, 118-19).

Although Defendant does not dispute the theft of the cash
and checks, there was a dispute as to whether he committed a
burglary.

Such dispute arises because of the location of where the

bag was obtained.

The facts supporting the verdict of the Judge

are that the bag was obtained from a desk in an office at the rear
of the store.1

(Tr. 56, 58, 119). See also, Exhibit 13.

The store manager testified that the office where he

defendant maintains that the bag was obtained from near the
front cash register.
4

believes the bag was taken from was left open and although there
was a sign indicating "Manager", there were no signs on the door
restricting entry by store patrons.

The store manager also

testified that had a store patron been found in the office, he
would not have considered it trespassing, although he would have
asked the patron to leave the office. Moreover, the store manager
did not consider the Defendant's entry into the store after closing
time to be trespassing.

(Tr. 66-67, 70, 74).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I:

There is not sufficient evidence to show that

Defendant entered the store and office unlawfully.

Therefore, all

of the elements of the offense of burglary were not established
beyond a reasonable doubt.
POINT II: The lower court acknowledged that the burglary
and theft constituted a "single criminal episode."

Accordingly,

Defendant should have been punished for only one of the offenses.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF UNLAWFUL
ENTRY TO SUPPORT THE JUDGEfS VERDICT AS TO THE
CHARGE OF BURGLARY
Based on Section 76-6-202 of the Utah Code, the elements
of the offense of burglary are as follows:
1. That the defendant enters or remains unlawfully in a
5

building or any portion of a building, and
2.

That the defendant so enters with the intent to

commit a felony or theft or commit an assault.
Utah Code. Ann. § 76-6-202(1)(1995).
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Defendant
intended to commit a theft and, in fact, did commit a theft of the
Deseret Industries store.

The remaining issue, therefore, is

whether he entered the Deseret Industries store and/or the office
unlawfully.
The

legislature

has

defined

"enters

or

remains

unlawfully" as entry "when the premises or any portion thereof at
the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and
when an actor is not licensed or otherwise privileged to enter or
remain on the premises or such portion thereof."

Id., § 76-6-

201(3) .
No Utah appellate court has ever directly applied Section
76-6-201(3) to a case similar to the one at bar.
Arable

v. State,

However, in

699 P.2d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), the defendant

entered a store open to the public and entered a walk-in beer
cooler posted with an "Employees Only" sign.
defendant attempted to commit a theft.

Thereafter, the

The Alaska Court of

Appeals, interpreting a burglary statute using the terms "enter or
remain unlawfully" just as Utah's, concluded that the defendant
6

entering of the beer cooler did not constitute a burglary.

The

court further concluded that the building had to be entirely closed
to the public at the time of entry in order for a burglary to have
occurred.

The Alaska Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
Entry into a restricted area of a building
which is otherwise open to the public is not a
severe intrusion and is not likely to
terrorize occupants; the public is generally
licensed or privileged to be within the
building. It is not the kind of entry that
burglary is designed to reach.
Under the
state's interpretation of "enter or remain
unlawfully," which would apply to anyone who
is present in a place where he has no right to
be, a shoplifter who stole from behind the
counter, from a window display, or from a
stock area would commit the crime of burglary.
Fourth-degree theft, a class B misdemeanor (AS
11.46.150),
would
become
second-degree
burglary, a class C felony (AS 11.46.310),
depending on precisely where within a public
building the defendant was standing when
committing the theft. Classification of cases
would
hinge
entirely
on
disputable
distinctions between open and closed areas of
public businesses, where boundaries between
such areas are often unenforced and illdefined, inadequately marked and widely
ignored.

Id. , at 894 (citation omitted).

See also, State

Conn. 199, 554 A.2d 1048 (1989); Commonwealth
Super. 591, 362 A.2d 1027 (1976); Champlin

v.

v.

v. Thomas,
Cost,

State,

210

238 Pa.

84 Wis. 2d

621, 267 N.W.2d 295 (1978).
In the instant case, although the store was closed, there
is no dispute that Defendant and Venson were permitted in the store
7

after closing.
transaction.

Indeed, Venson was even allowed to conduct a
Moreover, there was no stated or even implied

prohibition to the publicfs entering the office.

Most telling is

the fact that the office manager stated that he did not consider
Defendant's and Vensonfs presence on the premises after hours or
even Defendant's presence in the office to be an act of trespass
for which he would have notified authorities.

Accordingly, even

when considering the facts in a light most favorable to the Judge's
verdict, there is no evidence to support a finding that Defendant
entered or remained unlawfully on the Deseret Industries premises.
POINT II
THE BURGLARY AND THEFT CONSTITUTED A SINGLE
CRIMINAL EPISODE, BARRING DEFENDANT FROM BEING
PUNISHED UNDER BOTH PROVISIONS
Assuming that this Court determines that there was
sufficient evidence to support the burglary conviction, it must
then consider whether the lower court properly imposed consecutive
terms of incarceration for the two offenses.
Section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code provides that when the
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode would "establish
offenses which may be punished in different ways under different
provisions"

of the criminal code, he can only be punished under

one such provision.

Utah Code Ann., § 76-1-402(1) (1995).

In the instant case, the Court conceded that the acts of
8

Defendant constituted a "single criminal episode."
10.)

(Tr. of 7/7/97,

See alsof Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (Supp. 1997).
Although burglary is not a lesser included offense of

theft

or visa versa, and

Defendant may

convicted of both offenses, Duran v. Cook,
App.

be

constitutionally

788 P.2d 1038 (Utah Ct.

1990), in this case, he should not be punished for both

offenses.

Under the facts of this case, the theft establishes an

essential element of the burglary and, without the burglary, there
would be no theft. Accordingly, Defendant should be punished under
only one of the offenses and the sentences should run concurrent.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above argument, this Court should reverse
the conviction of the Defendant for burglary.

Alternatively, this

Court should vacate the judgment of the lower court and remand for
the purposes of entry of a judgment and sentence committing
Defendant to serve concurrent terms of incarceration for burglary
and theft.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

FLOY
Attorn

9

v J d a y of February, 1998.

AJtfz-

OLM
for Defendant/Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a two (2) true and
correct copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Ms.
Christine Soltis, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 4& day of
February, 1998, first class postage fully prepaid.
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ADDENDUM

FILED

SCOTT M.BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694
Telecopier: (801) 586-2737

JUL 2 1 1997
, 5th DISTRICT COURT
P < IRON COUNTY
[x /
Deputy Clerk

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]\

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE,
AND COMMITMENT

;

vs.

]

ROY LEE GLASPER,

]>

Criminal No. 971500079

])

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.

ihe Defendant, KO\ Lbb uLASPER, having been convicted pursuant to a non-jury trial
of the offenses of BURGLARY, a Third-Degree Felony, and THEFT, a Third-Degree Felony, on
April 2, 1997, and the Court having entered said verdicts of guilty and thereafter having ordered the
preparation of a presentence investigation report and after said report was prepared and presented
to the Court, the ( ourt having called the aln ivt -entitled matter on for sentencing on Jul) 7, 1997, in
Parowan, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, ROY LEE GLASPER, having appeared before the
Court in person together with his attorney of record. J. Bryan Jackson, and the State of Utah having
appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Bums, and the Court having heard
statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Iron County Attorney, and the Court having
reviewed the presentence investigation report and the file in detail, and being fully advised in the
premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, ROY LEE
GLASPER, has been convicted of the offenses of BURGLARY, a Third-Degree Felony, and
THEFT, a Third-Degree Felony, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything
to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary
being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and
convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, ROY LEE GLASPER, and pursuant to his
conviction of BURGLARY, a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment
for a period of zero (0) to five (5) years, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the
Utah Department of Corrections.
i'l IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, ROY LEE GLASPER, and pursuant to his
conviction of THEFT, a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a
period of zero (0) to five (5) years, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah
Department of Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temis of imprisonment set forth above shall be served
consecutively.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fine shall be imposed.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, ROY LEE GLASPER, and
-2-

deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in accordance
with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.
DATED this.

day of July, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

J0ss&4

J. PHILIP EVES
(f
District Court, Judge
CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Roy Lee Glasper,
Criminal No. 971500079, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah,
this

^

'\

day of July, 1997.

CAROLYN BUi * r\c
CAROLYN BULLOCH
District Court Clerk

( S I' <\ I )
Rv:
• '//:-Cn
. f
Deputy DistrictJ?ourt Clerk
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